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RATIONALLY CUTTING TAX EXPENDITURES
Gregg D. Polsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
To increase tax revenues, policymakers have two general options: they
can raise tax rates or broaden the tax base. Economists prefer the latter
option because it will be less distortive.' Raising tax rates reduces the
returns to labor and investment, thereby discouraging work (in favor of
leisure) 2 and saving (in favor of present consumption). 3 Broadening the
base, on the other hand, has less impact on the labor/leisure and
consume/save decisions because, while overall tax revenues are increased,
the returns to labor and investment at the margin remain the same.
Many of the tax reform provisions of the various recent deficit
reduction plans are premised on this intuition. While the plans differ in
important ways, many have at least one common denominator-the
eradication of many tax expenditures in one fell swoop. 4 Tax expenditures
are statutorily defined as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the
Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction
from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of
tax, or a deferral of tax liability. .. ." Tax expenditure items are taxpayerfavorable departures from a "normal income tax" baseline, and the amounts
of tax expenditures are the revenue losses resulting from the departure.' The

Willie Person Mangum Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. Thanks
to Alfred Brophy, John Coyle, Brant Hellwig, and Emily Satterthwaite for comments on an earlier draft.
See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government,46 J.L.
& ECON. 293, 317 (2003).
2 See 1 BORIS I. BrrrKER & LAWRENCE Ll)KKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS T 3.2.2 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that "taxing compensation from personal services decreases the
economic reward for labor . .. [and] other things being equal, this alters the labor-leisure balance in
favor of leisure.").
3 See id. at 3.2.3 (discussing the effect of income taxation on the consume versus save decision).
4 See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and DistributiveJustice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 4
(2011) ("Serious proposals for tax reform are on the table, and they share a simple, fundamental
approach to reshaping the law: strip the Code of the myriad special deductions, credits, and exclusions
that allow individuals and corporations to reduce their tax liability.").
' 2 U.S.C. §622 (2006).
6 JOINT ECON. COMM., 106TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

(Comm. Print 1999).
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determination of the normal tax baseline is made, depending on the report,
by the Joint Committee on Taxation or the Treasury Department.
The term "tax expenditures" is used because the revenue losses can be
easily re-conceptualized as direct spending programs. In lieu of a tax
expenditure, Congress could combine baseline tax treatment with direct
grants of cash equal to the amount of increased tax liabilities. Due to the
circular cash flow (from affected taxpayers to the government in the form of
increased tax liabilities relative to the baseline tax treatment and then from
the government to the taxpayers in the form of cash grants), the taxpayers
and the government end up in the same place. Thus, tax expenditures are
colloquially known as "spending through the tax code."
As noted, a number of serious proposals would eliminate most, if not
all, tax expenditures. The problem with this approach is that the category of
tax expenditures, as determined either by the Joint Committee or the
Treasury, is not a monolithic category.9 Professor Daniel Shaviro
characterizes tax rules as allocative or distributional.' Allocative rules
affect how resources are allocated among different activities by stimulating
or discouraging certain behavior, while distributional rules affect how
benefits and burdens are distributed among citizens." Some tax
expenditures are mostly allocative, while others are mostly distributional.12
Other tax expenditures are intended to be (or are defended as) allocative,
but in fact have little allocative effect in practice; as a result, these "faux"
allocative rules are in fact mostly distributive.13 Allocative expenditures
should be evaluated to determine whether the desired behavioral response
(and resulting allocative effect) is in fact desirable, whether the expenditure
is an efficient way to deliver the desired behavior, and whether the desired
behavior is of sufficient priority to justify its revenue cost in light of the
current budget situation. In other words, allocative tax expenditures should
be evaluated like any other spending program designed to encourage or
discourage behavior. Distributional tax expenditures, on the other hand,
should be evaluated to determine whether the distributional adjustment they
deliver makes the tax system more or less fair. Blanket treatment of tax

Id. at 2-3.
E.g., Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 975, 1027 (2011).
9 See Sugin, supra note 4, at 7 (criticizing reform proposals that "erroneously treat [tax
expenditures] as an undifferentiated mass").
10 See Daniel Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REv. 187,
188 (2004).
1 Id .
12 id
13 see, eg., infra ParN
8
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expenditures ignores the fact that these two distinct types of tax
expenditures-allocative and distributional-share nothing in common,
other than the fact that they are formally categorized as tax expenditures.
This article illustrates the differences between the two types of tax
expenditures by examining the child tax credit (a distributional
expenditure), the charitable deduction (an allocative expenditure), and taxfree saving accounts and the mortgage deduction (both of which are-usually
defended on allocative grounds but probably have mainly distributional
impacts). These differences should be well understood by policymakers as
they consider tax expenditure reform as part of a deficit reduction plan.
II. A DISTRIBUTIONAL TAX EXPENDITURE: THE CHILD TAX CREDIT
The child tax credit provides a fixed tax credit for taxpayers with
dependents who are characterized as a qualifying child.14 The child tax
credit is expected to cost nearly $122 billion from 2010 through 2014." The
$1,000 per child credit begins to phase out at $110,000 of adjusted gross
income (for married couples filing joint returns) and is fully phased out at
$130,000.16 It is currently partially refundable for those whose tax liability
becomes, as a result of the credit, negative.' 7 Because of the phaseout and
refundability, the child tax credit is targeted at lower- and middle-income
class taxpayers.
The child tax credit can be easily re-conceptualized as an additional
dependency deduction (on top of the current dependency deduction of
$3,700).' For taxpayers in the 25% tax bracket, the $1,000 credit operates
as an additional $4,000 dependency deduction; for 15% bracket taxpayers,
it operates as an additional $6,667 deduction.19 Because it is phased out at
$130,000 of adjusted gross income, the additional dependency deduction is
generally zero for those subject to marginal tax rates higher than 25%.20
Accordingly, the child tax credit can be seen as an accommodation to the
I.R.C. § 24 (2006).
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAxATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014 47 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JCT 2010-2014
REPORT] (scoring the child tax credit at $121.9 billion).
I.R.C. §24(b).
1
" Id. § 24(d).
18
See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297 (providing for $3,700 personal exemption amount for
2011).
19 A $4,000 deduction saves a 25% marginal rate taxpayer $1,000 in taxes, just like a $1,000 credit.
To adjust a credit amount into an equivalent deduction amount, the credit amount is divided by (1-t),
with t equal to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
20 See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297 (indicating that, for married couples filing jointly, the
28% rate applies to taxable income in excess of $139,350).
14
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fact that very basic child care is more expensive than the $3,700
dependency deduction implies. Yet the conclusion that the dependency
deduction is too low would support an across-the-board additional
dependency deduction for all taxpayers, whether they are in the 15%
bracket or the 35% bracket. Under this theory (i.e., that the dependency
deduction does not reflect the additional basic costs of raising a child), the
diminishing value to higher-income taxpayers might be justified on a "two
wrongs can make a right" ground.
Put differently, if one accepts the view that the dependency deduction
is too low, then the phaseout of the child tax credit results in an
overstatement of the tax bases of higher-income taxpayers with children.
The resulting overtaxation could be defended by arguing that higher-income
taxpayers are undertaxed in other ways and that the phaseout simply offsets
this undertaxation.
Alternatively, the child tax credit can be re-conceptualized as providing
different tax rate schedules for differently sized families. As a formal
matter, there is only one special rate schedule that applies to dependent
caregivers. The head of household bracket applies only to an unmarried
taxpayer who has at least one dependent in the household. 2 1 Absent the
dependent, the taxpayer would be subject to the higher rates applicable to
unmarried taxpayers. 22 For married taxpayers, there is no special rate
bracket for those with dependents. 2 3 As a result, there is very little nuance in
the tax rate schedules for family size (beyond the distinction between
married and unmarried taxpayers). The child tax credit can be viewed as
providing some such nuance. Whether the additional nuance is appropriate
depends on one's view of how progressive the tax system ought to be with
regard to differently-sized families.
In any event, it seems quite clear that the child tax credit is not an
allocative provision. It is not designed to encourage child-related spending,
as the tax benefit (i.e., a fixed per child credit) is granted irrespective of
how any amounts are spent. Nor is it designed to encourage more child
bearing, as one would expect the relatively small tax credit of $1,000 per
year per child to have no impact on the life-altering decision of whether to
have an additional child. Instead, the child tax credit is intended to alter the
distribution of tax burdens between the lower/middle-class with children
and all other taxpayers (namely, the lower/middle-class without children
and the upper class). Thus, whether the credit should be increased,

I.R.C. § 2(b).
id
23 LRC.§1.
21
22
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decreased, or eliminated depends on one's view of a fair tax burden
distribution.
It is important to note here that Congress's decision to provide the
distributional adjustment through a tax credit, as opposed to an
economically equivalent additional personal exemption or a separate rate
schedule for different family sizes, has the potential to have a significant
policy impact. The child tax credit is characterized as a tax expenditure, but
personal exemptions and different tax brackets are not. 24 Yet the formal
delivery mechanism (credit, additional deduction, or rate schedule) of the
distributional adjustment should not affect the decision of whether they are
maintained or not. This shows the logical error in treating tax expenditures
as a monolithic category: certain provisions whose main function is to make
distributional adjustments will be captured by such an approach.
Meanwhile, other substantively identical mechanisms are not denominated
as tax expenditures and therefore would be spared if tax expenditures were
eliminated.
III. AN ALLOCATIVE TAX ExPENDITURE: THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

Taxpayers can deduct gifts made to charitable organizations. 2 The
charitable deduction is expected to cost the government approximately $250
billion from 2010 through 2014.26 Some have argued that a charitable
deduction is necessary to arrive at a proper calculation of one's income
based on the view that charitable gifts result in a non-consumptive
reduction of wealth.27 While this argument has some merit, that does not
necessarily mean that the charitable deduction should be characterized as a
primarily distributional tax expenditure. Charitable gift-giving is a purely
voluntary choice. If the charitable deduction were eliminated, givers could
simply reduce their gifts to account for the additional tax burden they bear.
For instance, consider a 35% marginal tax rate taxpayer who makes a

24 See JCT 2010-2014 REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 47 (stating "[t]he
Joint Committee staff views
the personal exemptions and the standard deduction as defining the zero-rate bracket that is a part of
normal tax law. An itemized deduction that is not necessary for the generation of income is classified as
a tax expenditure" and treating the child tax credit as a tax expenditure).
25 I.R.C. § 170.
26 See JCT 2010-2014 REPORT, supra note 15, at 45, 47, 48 (estimating revenue loss from
charitable contributions to schools at $33.3 billion; $187.5 billion from contributions to organizations
other than schools and health organizations; and $25.3 billion from contributions to health
organizations).
27 See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: Deducting
Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FoRDHAM L.
REy. 1243, 1280 (2002).
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$100,000 deductible charitable gift. If the deduction were disallowed, the
taxpayer could give $65,000 and retain the extra $35,000 to pay the tax on
the extra $100,000 of taxable income.2 8 Because the taxpayers could easily
alter their behavior in response to the elimination of the charitable
deduction, the primary impact of the charitable deduction is allocative, not
distributional.29
Thus, the typical justification for the charitable deduction is that it
encourages additional charitable giving, thereby resulting in an allocation of
more resources to the charitable sector.30 This justification appears
premised on the idea that donors respond to the charitable deduction by
giving an additional amount above and beyond merely the tax break they
are getting. Consider again the 35% rate taxpayer who gives a $100,000
charitable donation. The incentives-based justification for the charitable
deduction is based on the premise that, had the taxpayer not received the
deduction, the taxpayer would have given less than the $65,000 after-tax
cost of her gift. If the taxpayer would have given exactly $65,000, then all
the charitable deduction did is direct the $35,000 of foregone governmental
tax revenues (which would have been used for the public good) to the
charity of the taxpayer's choosing. Other proponents of the charitable
deduction justify the deduction precisely because it allows the government
to piggyback off of taxpayers' choices as to which charitable endeavors to
support? This, as the pluralistic argument goes, allows worthwhile societal
pursuits to obtain financing without the necessity of going through the

28 Cf Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on Section 527 Organizations,28 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1773, 1776-77 (2007) (explaining that the after-tax cost of a deductible expense is the product of
the pre-tax cost and (1-t), where t represents the taxpayer's marginal tax rate). In the hypothetical, the
after-tax cost of a $100,000 deductible contribution is $100,000 x (1-35). If the deduction were
disallowed, then the pre-tax cost would equal the after-tax cost, and the taxpayer could remain in the
same position by reducing the contribution to $65,000.
2 The likelihood of behavioral change in the face of a tax change is a key distinction between a
distributional provision like the child tax credit and an allocative provision like the charitable deduction.
In theory it is possible that changing the child tax credit could change a taxpayer's decision to have a set
number of children, but practically we do not expect it to have any such impact. On the other hand, a
behavioral response to a change in the charitable deduction is much more likely.
3 See J. Comm. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE FEDERAL TAX

TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, JCX-55-11, 32 (2011) [hereinafter JCT REPORT ON

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS] ("Tax deductibility of charitable contributions reduces the economic cost
to the donor of his or her donation and, therefore, encourages charitable giving."); id. at 34 ("Because
the deduction for charitable contributions lowers the after-tax cost of giving, theoretically, it will
increase the ability and willingness of donors to increases donations."); Brian Galle, The Role of Charity
in a FederalSystem, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 777, 787 (2012) ("Most commentators embrace the idea
that the deduction is a subsidy and argue that the subsidy is justified as a tool for encouraging the
production of goods that would otherwise be underproduced by the private market.").
31 See id at 788-89 (describing this justification).
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political process.32 It also allows the government to indirectly support
religious organizations-something it could not do directly because of the
First Amendment. 33 Both of these justifications are allocative. The
incentives-based justification assumes that more resources are devoted to
charitable causes, while the pluralistic justification is that more resources
are devoted to the "right" charitable causes even though the overall amount
of spending on public goods remains constant.
The proper design of the charitable deduction depends on which of the
two justifications is invoked.34 A justification based on incentives would
provide increasing incentives to those who have larger amounts of
disposable income, as the tax law currently does by granting a deduction,
whose value increases as the taxpayer's marginal tax rate increases. On the
other hand, the pluralistic rationale would support a fixed credit (e.g., 20%
of the charitable contribution), which gives the same governmental "match"
to all donations, regardless of the donor's income level.
Regardless, in a time of significant budgetary concerns where all
government spending must be critically evaluated, government spending
through the wide-ranging, and nearly unlimited35 charitable deduction is a
definite candidate for reform. Shannon Weeks McCormack has recently
proposed restricting the charitable deduction to those that flow to charitable
organizations that would, absent the deduction, be underfunded. But it is
unclear whether distinguishing between "worthy" and "unworthy"
charitable beneficiaries in this manner is administratively feasible. If not, a
better approach might be to turn the deduction into a fixed credit and to
significantly reduce the current limits for charitable contributions that
provide tax benefits.37
32 See David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the
Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REv. 221, 246 (2009) (explaining that the charitable
deduction lends support to minority preferences which may be underrepresented in the political process).
33 See id. (noting that the charitable deduction allows public funding of religious groups in a way
that would be unconstitutional if directly affected by government officials).
34 The empirical evidence is mixed as to how donors actually respond to the charitable deduction.
Some studies suggest that donors give more than the tax break they receive, while others arrive at the
opposite conclusion. For a discussion of the empirical evidence, see JCT REPORT ON CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 30, at 34-35.
3s Section 170 does limit the charitable deduction to 50%, 30%, or 20% of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income (with carry-overs of the excess for up to five years) depending on the nature of the
contributed property and type of donee, but these limits are quite high and therefore only rarely
triggered. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1).
36 See generally Shannon Weeks McCormack, Too Close to Home: Limiting the Organizations
Subsidized by the Charitable Deduction to Those in Economic Need, 63 FLA. L. REv. 857 (2011).
3 Current law limits the charitable deduction to 50%, 30%, or 20% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income, depending on the nature of the beneficiary and whether appreciated property (rather than cash)
is contributed. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1). In light of budgetary constraints, the limit could be reduced to, for
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IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL TAX EXPENDITURES DISGUISED AS ALLOCATIVE TAX
EXPENDITURES: TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND THE
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION

Some tax expenditures are commonly justified on allocative grounds,
but in reality do not substantially affect the allocation of resources in the
manner intended. As a result, their impact is mostly distributional. Two
prominent examples of these "faux" allocative tax expenditures are
provisions for tax-favored retirement accounts and the home mortgage
interest deduction.
A. Tax-FavoredRetirement Accounts

A number of tax provisions are designed to encourage dedicated
retirement saving.38 The general effect of these provisions is to exempt from
tax the investment yield attributable to amounts saved for retirement,
though the precise mechanics differ.39 401(k) and traditional IRA accounts
are funded with pre-tax dollars, and distributions are subject to tax.40 On the
other hand, Roth IRA accounts are funded with after-tax dollars, and
distributions are exempt.4 ' Regardless, the economic effect of yield
exemption is, under reasonable assumptions, nearly identical.42
From 2010 through 2014, the tax expenditures for retirement savings
are expected to cost the government over $700 billion.4 3 The most common
justification for this outlay is that these provisions encourage retirement

example, 10% of adjusted gross income across the board. Thus, for example, taxpayers could be allowed
a 20% tax credit for contributions not in excess of 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. In
addition, taxpayers should be required to recognize any built-in gain on the contribution of appreciated
property; as a result, there would be no need to provide a different limit for contributions of property.
" See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 408(a).
3 See 3 BORIS 1.BffTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND
GIFTs 161 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the effect of the qualified retirement plans).
4 See, e.g., §§ 219, 408(d) (providing for tax-deductible contributions and taxable distributions
with respect to IRAs); see also Tax Topics: Pensions and Retirement Savings, TAX POLICY CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Retirement-Saving.cfin (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
4' TAX POLICY CTR., supra note 40; see § 408A (providing for nondeductible contributions and
nontaxable distributions with respect to Roth IRAs).
41 See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured Settlements, 51 B. C. L. REv. 39, 47
n.31 (2010) (showing the general equivalence between traditional IRA and Roth IRA tax treatment).
Certain assumptions are necessary for this equivalence to hold. For example, tax rates must remain
constant between the time the IRA is funded and the time of distributions. For discussion of these
conditions, see CHRIS H. HANNA, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAX DEFERRAL: THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN 11-12 (2000).
4 See JCT REPORT 2010-2014, supra note 15, at 49 (estimating revenue loss attributable to
pensions and IRAs at $711 billion).
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saving and that, absent the expenditures, the amount of such saving in the
United States would be suboptimal." Thus, these provisions are defended
on allocative grounds: they generate more saving and less consumption.
However, even assuming that the amount of dedicated retirement
savings in the United States would be suboptimal absent these expenditures,
there are several reasons to question their effectiveness. Most significantly,
the tax incentive often does not result in additional savings (new savings);
instead it merely moves from one account (taxable) to another account
(IRA) money that would have been saved regardless. 45 The wealthy
practically cannot spend all of their income currently; they are, in effect,
forced to save at least a portion of their income. In those cases, the tax
expenditures are paying the taxpayer to do something that she has no choice
but to do. Furthermore, many taxpayers with even modest wealth would
choose to save for retirement regardless of the tax breaks. Every dollar of
new savings generated by the tax expenditures must be evaluated against all
of the foregone revenue stemming from tax breaks granted with respect to
amounts that would have been saved regardless.
To increase saving (as opposed to moving saving from one form to
another), a tax incentive should be targeted at reluctant savers. Yet, several
design features of the current tax breaks would appear to deter reluctant
savers. First, taxpayers generally cannot withdraw money from a taxfavored account before retirement age without paying a penalty for early
withdrawal.46 For reluctant savers with modest income, this inflexibility
will be a significant concern. Second, the sheer complexity of the numerous
overlapping tax-favored savings vehicles and the varying investment
options within them can deter reluctant savers, especially those who are
financially unsophisticated or do not have access to investment advice.
Third, the value of the tax benefits granted to a taxpayer corresponds
directly with the taxpayer's income level. 4 7 Because the tax benefits come
in the form of deductions and exclusions (rather than credits), the greater
the taxpayer's income, the greater the benefit derived by the taxpayer, and

" See Elizabeth Bell et al., Tax Notes: Retirement Savings Incentives and Personal Saving, TAX
POLICY CTR. (Dec. 20, 2004), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfn?ID=1000739.
4 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings
Accounts, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1107 (2006).
46 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 72(t) (providing for 10% penalty for early distributions from qualified
retirement plans); see also Tax on Early Distributionsfrom Traditional and ROTH IRAs, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc557.html.
" See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez & Jennifer M. Martinez, The Internal Revenue Code and Latino Realities: A
CriticalPerspective,22 U. FLA. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 377, 403 (2011) ("In order to take advantage oftax benefits, a
taxpayer must not only reach a certain income level, a taxpayer must also know about the tax benefits.").
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vice versa. This upside-down result means that taxpayers with modest
income receive relatively little incentive to save.
All of these features are counterproductive as to the goal of stimulating
new savings. Wealthy taxpayers will save at least the maximum tax-favored
amount48 regardless of any incentives (because of the practical inability to
spend the vast majority of their income). Highly motivated and welladvised savers will not be deterred by the inflexibility, complexity, and
upside-down effect. On the other hand, reluctant savers are likely to be
deterred. This suggests that, in practice, the tax expenditures for saving will
have little incentive effect (other than the insignificant effect of moving
money from taxable accounts to tax favored accounts), despite the huge
revenue loss. There is some empirical support for this intuition.49 If the
intuition is true, the tax expenditures for saving function mainly as a
distributional device. And given the demographics of savers and the fact
that the value of the tax benefit is directly related to the taxpayer's income
level, the distributional impact of the saving expenditures is significantly
regressive. The result is a worst-of-both-worlds combination of reduced
progressivity without any efficiency gain from a reduction in the marginal
tax rates.so
In contrast, the saver's credit, found in § 25B of the Code, is much
better designed to stimulate new saving. Section 25B provides a credit of
10%, 20%, or 50% of contributions to savings accounts. 5 ' The credit phases
out at adjusted gross income levels of $30,000.52 Simplifying and
expanding this credit would provide a far more targeted and efficient saving
incentive than the current tax breaks provide.
Alternatively, tax-favored accounts could remain available on a much
smaller scale and in a simpler form, with some additional flexibility. This

48 The maximum amount saved that is eligible for tax benefits is $49,000 per year, which is the cap
for employer defined contribution plans. I.R.C. § 415(c). 401(k) limits are $15,500 per year, but older
taxpayers are eligible for an additional $5,500 "catch-up" contribution. §§ 402(g), 441(v).
49 See Karen M. Pence, 401(k)s and Household Savings: New Evidence from the Survey of
Consumer Finances (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2002-06); William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, IRAs
andHousehold Savings, 84 Am. ECON. REV. 1233 (1994). Other studies, however, have found a larger
response. See David J. Benjamin, Does 401(k) Eligibility Increase Saving? Evidence from Propensity
Score Subclassification, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1259 (2003); James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, & David A.
Wise, Do 401(k) Contributions Crowd out Other PersonalSaving?, 58 J. Pub. Econ. 1 (1995); James M.
Poterba, Steven F. Venti, & David A. Wise, How Retirement ProgramsIncrease Saving, 10 J. Econ.
Persp. 91 (1996).
50 Note that while a saver's effective tax rate goes down because of the retirement tax expenditures,
their marginal tax rate remains the same. And it is the marginal tax rate that affects incentives whether to
work and save to earn the additional dollar.
s' I.R.C. § 25B(a)b)(1) (2006).
52 Id.

RATIONALLY CUTTING TAX EXPENDITURES

2012]

653

would be far less expensive than current law and more likely to motivate
reluctant savers. Relative to complete repeal of the saving subsidies, this
reform would also simplify tax reporting-if all investment accounts were
taxable, many more taxpayers would need to keep track of basis, and report
dividends, gains, and losses. Under the current rules, low-income andmiddle class taxpayers typically make most of their stock and securities
investments in tax-favored accounts. 5 3 Retaining tax-favored accounts,
albeit in much more modest form, would maintain this simplicity.
Under a proposed smaller, simpler, and more flexible tax-favored
account, all taxpayers could be allowed to invest up to, say, $5,000 of aftertax cash per year into a Roth-style account; this would represent the only
tax-favored savings account available. (Therefore, college savings
accounts-§ 529 programs and prepaid tuition plans 54-- would no longer be
available.) Distributions after retirement age (or for certain specified
purposes, such as education) would be tax-free. To provide flexibility to
taxpayers of modest means, taxpayers could be allowed to withdraw up to
$1,000 per year for any reason without tax or penalty before retirement age.
While most commentators have pointed to the encouragement-of-saving
rationale in defending tax-favored saving accounts, others defend them on
the ground that they move the U.S. tax system closer to a consumption tax
regime. 5 Amounts invested in these accounts are generally taxed only when
they are pulled out to purchase consumption. (In Roth-style accounts, the
mechanics are different but the tax effect is generally the same.56)
Accordingly, tax-favored saving accounts represent a partial move towards
a consumption tax. Some believe that a consumption tax is superior to an
income tax, mostly on the grounds that a consumption tax (i) does not
(relative to an income tax) discourage saving 7 and (ii) is simpler to
administer.s However meritorious these arguments are in the debate about
which tax base-income or consumption-is best, they have far less merit
as justifications for the current tax expenditures for saving. The current
rules apply only to a limited dollar amount of saving, ranging from $5,000

53 See William Gale & Benjamin Harris, The Tax Policy Briefing Book, TAX POLICY CTR. (Dec. 14,
2007), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/savings-retirement/who.cfm.
54 I.R.C. § 529(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
5 See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 4, at 43-44 (arguing that the retirement savings provisions should be
maintained because they represent a modification of the tax base that reflects reasonable differences
about the ideal tax base-consumption or income).
56 See supra note 42.
5 Janet A. Meade, The Effects of Income and Consumption Tax Regimes and Future Tax Rate
Uncertainty on ProportionalSavings and Risk-Taking, 70 ACCT. REV. 635, 651 (1995).
58
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for IRA contributions" to $49,000 for defined contribution plans provided
by employers.60 These relatively low limits mean that the wealthy are
inevitably taxed on an income tax basis at the margin, which is what
matters for both incentive and simplification purposes. And the wealthy,
whose saving behavior is most elastic,6 are the most significant group in
terms of affecting the amount of overall national saving.62 Put differently,
the relatively low limits on tax-favored retirement accounts effectively put
lower- and middle-class people on a consumption tax while leaving wealthy
people mostly (and, importantly, at the, margin) on an income tax. Leaving
wealthy people on the income tax disposes of much of whatever efficiency
and simplifications gains that the system would generate by moving fully to
a pure consumption tax. Accordingly, the argument that the retirement
savings tax expenditures are justified as a partial move to a consumption tax
does not appear persuasive. This is not to say that a full-fledged move to a
consumption tax might not be worthwhile. But that is a completely different
discussion.
B. The Home MortgageInterestDeduction
The home mortgage interest deduction is expected to cost nearly $500
billion from 2010 through 2014.3 Proponents of the deduction may defend
it in a number of ways. Some argue that all consumer interest should be
removed from the tax base on the ground that the cost of accelerating
consumption (i.e., the cost of borrowing to consume now rather than later)
is not itself consumption.64 Under this view, all consumer interest should be
deductible, which means that the Code punishes consumer interest other
than mortgage interest (and certain other deductible consumer interest)
rather than subsidizing mortgage interest. Others disagree with this view,
arguing that consumer interest is itself consumption. 5 Regardless, this
theoretical dispute is not particularly relevant to the current topic. Whether

s9 I.R.C. § 219.
6
I.R.C. § 415(c); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2012 REVENUE PROPOSALS 5 (2011).
61 Poor people are unable to save, while middle-class people are forced to save a certain amount to
maintain a decent standard of living after retirement.
62 Mariacristina De Nardi, Wealth Inequality and IntergenerationalLinks, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS RESEARCH DEP'T 2 (Nov. 26, 2002), http://www.nber.org/-denardim/research/FedStaff
Report.pdf.
61 See JCT Report 2010-2014, supra note 15, at 39 (estimating the revenue loss at $484.1 billion).
6 See Barbara H. Fried, Fairnessand the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 967-97 (1992).
Nor, to complete the Haig-Simons formulation of income, does paying interest increase net worth.
65 Id. at 1002 n.116.
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consumption or not, paying mortgage interest is voluntary because
taxpayers can avoid it by renting their housing rather than buying it. Thus,
there is no ability-to-pay argument in favor of excluding mortgage interest
from the tax base (assuming that residential rental payments remain
nondeductible).
Generally, proponents of the mortgage deduction argue that home
ownership creates positive externalities and that, therefore, the purchase of
owner-occupied housing should be encouraged.66 This is the most common
justification for continuing the mortgage interest deduction. Under this
view, the home mortgage interest deduction is an incentive designed to
increase the stock of owner-occupied housing. The underlying premisethat home ownership needs to be encouraged through the tax laws despite
other existing significant government interventions in housing-is highly
debatable. Even assuming this premise, the mortgage deduction is not welldesigned to fulfill the goal of increasing the stock of owner-occupied
housing. The deduction applies to interest on mortgage loans up to
$1,100,000,67 which is much higher than necessary to influence those on the
68
rent-versus-own margin. The deduction also applies to a second residence
(or yacht6 ). The large limitation amount and the availability of the
deduction for second residences mean that the deduction is significantly
overbroad. Furthermore, the deduction is unavailable to those who do not
itemize (who tend to be far less wealthy than those who do itemize).70 Also,
because the tax expenditure is distributed through a deduction (rather than a
credit), it is much more valuable to higher-income taxpayers than poorer
ones. This means that the home buying incentive is perversely targeted to
those who would inevitably buy houses, regardless of any tax breaks. At a
minimum, this analysis suggests that, if the deduction is supposed to
encourage home ownership, it should be redesigned with a substantially

6

See, e.g., J. MICHAEL COLLINS, NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP EXPANDING THE AMERICAN

DREAM: A HOMEOWNERSHIP GuIDE FOR GRANTMAKERS 4-6 (2004), available at http://www.nfg.org/
index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/3660.
6' The deduction for interest on acquisition indebtedness covers the first $1,000,000 of debt. I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii). Another $100,000 of mortgage indebtedness is covered by the home equity
indebtedness interest deduction. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). The $1,000,000 limit and $100,000 limit can be
stacked together to allow $1.1 million of acquisition indebtedness to qualify for the interest deduction.
See Rev. Rul. 2010-25.
6 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II) (extending the deduction for debt related to one non-principal
residence at the taxpayer's choosing).
69 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii) (1986) (extending the definition of qualified
residence to include mobile homes, recreational vehicles, and boats that have sleeping and cooking
facilities and restrooms).
70 See I.R.C. § 62(a) (listing above-the-line deductions; list does not include home mortgage
interest deduction).
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lower limit and a prohibition against second-home loans and restructured as
a fixed credit (e.g., 15% of interest paid) rather than a deduction.
As currently designed, however, the deduction likely provides little
effect on the overall stock of owner-occupied housing. (The deduction
likely does significantly influence the sizes and value of homes, but those
effects are not cited by defenders of the deduction.) Thus, the main effect is
distributive, by reducing the tax burdens of the middle and upper class who
borrow to buy first and second homes.
At first glance, this distributive effect seems very problematic. By
reducing the tax burdens of home owners relative to less wealthy renters,
the deduction appears to make the tax system less progressive. But the
deduction also reduces the tax burdens of leveraged home owners relative
to the more wealthy outright home owners (those who buy their homes for
cash and therefore do not receive mortgage interest deductions). Thus,
whether the distributive effect of the mortgage interest deduction is
beneficial depends on one's point of reference.
This distributive effect is a result of the way the tax law treats "imputed
income." 7 Homeowners (whether leveraged or outright) enjoy the use of
their home, and they are not taxed on that benefit. This exclusion of
imputed income is, as a theoretical matter, an imperfection in our tax
system. In theory, taxpayers should be taxed on the imputed rental value of
their homes (as well as the imputed rental value of other consumer durables,
such as cars and refrigerators), and they should be allowed to take
deductions for the costs associated with generating that rent (such as
depreciation and interest). For practical and political reasons, however,
imputed income is not directly taxed. 72 Disallowing an interest deduction
for the leveraged purchase of a consumer durable serves as a proxy tax on
the imputed income from the durable. Providing the interest deduction, on
the other hand, allows the owner-borrower to retain the imputed income
exclusion. Viewed this way, the mortgage deduction puts the ownerborrower on par with an outright owner; each receives, in effect, the tax-

" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "imputed income" as "The benefit one receives
from the use of one's own property, the performance of one's services, or the consumption of self-produced
goods and services.").
72 The exclusion of imputed income is not considered a tax expenditure by the Joint Committee,
despite the fact that it is a departure from a pure income tax, because the exclusion is considered an
administrative necessity. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, JCX- 15-11, 5

(2011). The Treasury Department does consider the exclusion of net rental imputed income of
homeowners (though not the exclusion of imputed income generally) a tax expenditure in its report. See
id. at 5 n.10. See also JIM SAXTON, STAFF OF J. ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., A GUIDE TO TAX POLICY
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS WITH DISTRIBUTIONAL TAX TABLES 19 (Comm. Print 2000).
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free rental value of their house. On the other hand, renters always must pay
their rent with after-tax dollars. Disallowing the mortgage deduction would
treat owner-borrowers the same as renters, but would still favor outright
owners. The only way to tax everyone (outright owners, leveraged owners,
and renters) consistently would be to either tax imputed income from
houses or allow a deduction for rent paid, both of which are not politically
feasible.73
It is also important to note that wealthy leveraged owners would be able
to respond to a repeal of the mortgage interest deduction simply by selling
financial assets, which would have generated future taxable income, and
using the cash proceeds to pay off their mortgages, thereby turning taxable
income-income from financial assets-into tax-free imputed income (rentfree use of their home). As a practical matter, repeal of the mortgage
deduction would indirectly tax the imputed rental income of owners who
lack existing financial resources to pay off their mortgages. Thus, repealing
the mortgage interest deduction would have a significant generational
impact. Older taxpayers are more likely to have paid off their mortgages or
to have the financial assets to do so. Younger people are more likely, even
if they have high incomes, to have substantial mortgages.74
V. CONCLUSION

The discussion above shows that rationally cutting tax expenditures is
no easy task. First, tax expenditures must be categorized as mostly
allocative or mostly distributive provisions. This is difficult, as some tax
expenditures are claimed to be allocative but in reality may function mostly
as distributive because they do not affect behavior in a significant way.
Allocative tax expenditures should be evaluated to determine whether the
desired behavioral effect is beneficial, whether the tax expenditure is welldesigned to accomplish that effect, and whether that effect is worth the
revenue loss in light of the current budget situation. In other words,
allocative tax expenditures should be evaluated like any other spending
program. Distributive tax expenditures, on the other hand, should be
evaluated to determine whether they either increase or decrease the fairness
of the tax system.

7

For further discussion of the interaction between the mortgage interest deduction and the

exclusion of imputed rental income, see MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 216-19 (12th ed. 2011).

74 Michael S. Knoll, Taxation, Negative Amortization andAffordable Mortgages, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1341,1348 (1992).

